

Message Text

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ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 HA-05
OMB-01 ACDA-12 AID-05 TRSE-00 EB-08 COME-00 MCE-00
MMO-01 /096 W
-----111843 200914Z /10

R 200606Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6431
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MANAMA 1655

DEPT PASS AID AND ACDA WASHDC

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, PACT, BA
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE/
BAHRAIN

REF: (A) STATE 167901 (B) STATE 168320 (C) USCINCEUR 071545Z JUL78
(D) USCINCEUR 131635Z JUL 78

RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO PARA 3(A) OF REFTEL A:

(1) BAHRAIN HAS THE SMALLEST (SOME 2300 TROOPS) AND THE MOST
POORLY EQUIPPED ARMED FORCE IN THE AREA. THERE IS AN UNDER-
STANDABLE DESIRE NOT TO INVOLVE OURSELVES HERE IN A MILITARY
RELATIONSHIP INVOLVING UNWARRANTED QUANTITIES OR QUALITIES OF
WEAPONS. FORTUNATELY, MOST SENIOR BAHRAINI OFFICIALS NEITHER
WANT NOR SEE THE NEED FOR MASSIVE SPENDING ON SOPHISTICATED
ARMS. THE USG CONDUCTED A DEFENSE SURVEY IN 1976 AND HAS AGREED
TO SELL LIMITED MATERIAL AND TRAINING TO THE BAHRAIN DEFENSE

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FORCE (BDF). A STUDY IS UNDERWAY WITHIN USG TO DETERMINE IF
BAHRAIN COULD BE USEFULLY INTEGRATED INTO THE SAUDI I-HAWK
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM, A POSSIBLE ADVANCE OF THE REGIONAL
COOPERATION POLICY WHICH BOTH WE AND BAHRAIN FAVOR.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SALES TO WHICH WE HAVE AGREED WILL
PROVIDE THE BDF WITH A DEFENSE POSTURE REASONABLE IN TERMS
OF BAHRAIN'S SIZE AND LOCATION. IT SHOULD ENHANCE AS WELL

OUR POLICY OF HELPING OUR FRIENDS, AND BEING SEEN TO DO SO,
WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF OUR WIDER POLICIES.

SPECIFIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES ARE:

- A) TO INCREASE BAHRAIN'S ABILITY TO COOPERATE WITH ITS LARGER
AND WEALTHIER NEIGHBORS IN SUCH REGIONAL ENDEAVORS AS MAY EMERGE;
- B) TO DEVELOP MARITIME PATROL AND QUICK REACTION CAPABILITY,
EMPLOYING FAST PATROL BOATS AND HELICOPTERS, TO PROVIDE OFFSHORE
DEFENSE AND A MEANS OF COUNTERING SEABORNE INFILTRATION;
- C) TO DEVELOP MODERATE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY TO PROTECT ITS
LIMITED NUMBER OF KEY INSTALLATIONS;
- D) TO ENHANCE MOBILITY OF SECURITY FORCES WITHIN THE LIMITED
RANGE OF BAHRAIN'S DEFENSE NEEDS;
- E) TO ESTABLISH A COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM AND ORGANIZATIONAL
RELATIONSHIPS THAT INSURE EFFECTIVE COOPERATION BY GROUND, SEA
AND AIR UNITS OF BDF;
- F) TO ASSIST IN CENTRALIZING OF LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE
FUNCTIONS OF BAHRAIN'S DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES FOR
MAXIMUM ECONOMY AND EFFICIENCY.

(2) THE GOVERNMENT OF BAHRAIN DOES NOT PERCEIVE AN EXTERNAL
THREAT TO ITSELF WHICH IS DISTINCT FROM A THREAT TO ITS
NEIGHBORS IN THE GULF. THE CONCERN IS FOR A GENERALIZED
ATTACK ON THE GULF AND ITS OIL FACILITIES. GOB'S INTENTION
IS TO BE IN A MINIMALLY EFFECTIVE POSITION TO AID IN JOINT
REGIONAL DEFENSE IN FACE OF SUCH ATTACK AND TO GIVE ITS OWN
KEY FACILITIES, INCLUDING THE LARGE U.S.-OWNED REFINERY,
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SOME PROTECTION. THE RULING FAMILY ALSO PERCEIVES AN INTERNAL
THREAT FROM LOCAL RADICAL GROUPS WHICH, THOUGH SMALL, RECEIVE
THE SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF IRAQ AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT,
LIBYA. IN THE FACE OF THIS THREAT, GOB'S PUBLIC SECURITY UNIT
HAS BEEN WELL TRAINED AND IS STILL STAFFED AT THE HIGHEST
LEVELS BY EXPATRIATES. GOB HAS ALSO ACTED TO CONTROL THE
MOVEMENT AND ACTIVITIES OF ITS STUDENTS ABROAD, AND HAS DIS-
COURAGED STUDENTS FROM GOING TO IRAQ.

(3) THE MISSION BELIEVES THAT GOB'S PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT
ARE BASICALLY REALISTIC AND HAS ENCOURAGED THE NOTION OF
REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR A DEFENSE. WE FEEL THAT THE BEST DEFENSE
AGAINST THE INTERNAL THREAT FROM LOCAL RADICALS IS AN INCREASED
WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE RULING ESTABLISHMENT TO SHARE
MORE WIDELY THE WEALTH THAT HAS FLOWN FROM OIL AND TO DO SO
THROUGH A MORE WIDELY REPRESENTATIVE POLITICAL STRUCTURE THAN
NOW EXISTS.

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R 200606Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6432

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

JCS WASHDC

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F C D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 MANAMA 1655

DEPT PASS AID AND ACDA WASHDC

(4) GOB WISHES TO DEVELOP AN INCREASED AIR WING AND A SMALL NAVAL ARM AS COMPLEMENTS TO ITS PRESENT FORCE WHICH IS ALMOST ENTIRELY A LAND ARMY. THE AIR WING IS UNLIKELY TO INCLUDE FIXED WING AIRCRAFT (12 NEW HELICOPTERS ARE SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY DURING FY 79), BUT IN LIGHT OF THIS FACT, GOB WANTS IT TO INCLUDE A SOPHISTICATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM CAPABLE OF EARLY WARNING, AND LINKED TO THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM OF THE EASTERN VROVINCE OF SAUDI ARABIA. THEY INTEND THAT THE NAVAL ARM INCLUDE PATROL BOATS CAPABLE OF LOCAL MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND MUNIMAL DEFENSE.

(5) THE GROUND FORCES ARE REASONABLY MANNED AND EQUIPPED TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR PRIMARY MISSION; HOWEVER, AT PRESENT, THEY ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY OTHER FUNCTION. THE BDF IS CAPABLE ONLY OF PROVIDING VIP TRANSPORT, BASIC SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS, MINIMAL TROOP LIFT AND GROUND DEFENSE. AIR DEFENSE, NAVAL DEFENSE, AND MARITIME SURVEILLANCE ARE NIL. IN LIGHT OF OUR OFT REPEATED ENCOURAGEMENT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEFENSE WE SUPPORT GOB'S

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DESIRES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF BOTH AN AIR WING, WITHOUT FIXED WING AIRCRAFT, AND A NAVAL ARM. WE HAVE ALSO ENCOURAGED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT SUCH A SYSTEM CAN BE INTEGRATED INTO

SAUDI AIR DEFENSE. WE DEEM IT IMPORTANT THAT THE BDF ESTABLISH A COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM TO INSURE EFFECTIVE COORDINATION BETWEEN ITS GROUND, SEA AND AIR UNITS.

(6) THE ESTIMATE OF EXPENDITURES FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FOR FY 79 ARE \$46,100,720.00 WHICH REPRESENTS 11 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL PLANNED EXPENDITURE FOR FY 79 OF \$394,600,000.00. OF THIS TOTAL, ITIMIZED ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

WAGT & SALARIES:	\$22,742,680
GENERAL EXPENSES:	\$ 4,871,600
UNCLASSIFIED EXPENDITURES	
& TRANSFER PAYMENTS	\$18,486,440

IN ADDITION CAPITAL COSTS FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE - LARGELY QUARTERS, HOSPITAL AND CLUBS - ARE ESTIMATED AT \$5,356,200.00. THE FIGURE FOR GENERAL EXPENSES REPRESENTS OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COSTS. THE FIGURE FOR UNCLASSIFIED EXPENDITURES AND TRANSFER PAYMENTS REPRESENTS MONIES PAID ABROAD TO FOREIGN PERSONNEL EMPLOYED BY BDF, TRAINING COSTS AND PURCHASES OF MATERIAL. MOST PURCHASES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, HOWEVER, INCLUDING PROJECTED PURCHASES FROM THE U.S. ARE MADE ALMOST ENTIRELY WITH SAUDI FUNDS. THERE ARE NO FOREIGN EXCHANGE OR DEBT SERVICING PROBLEMS.

(7) PROJECTED PROGRAM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS FOR FY 80, 80 & 82 ARE AS FOLLOWS:

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(IN MILLION\$)	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82
INVESTMENT	19.05	1.50	.75
TRAINING	1.24	1.49	1.28
OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE	-	-	.06
ADMINISTRATION	3.10	-	-

(8) THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF PROJECTED DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES IS EXTRACTED FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REPORT OF BAHRAIN DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS, 1976. THE REPORT WAS NOT HANDED TO GOB UNTIL SEPTEMBER, 1977. AS A THREE-YEAR DELAY IN DELIVERY WAS ANTICIPATED, YEAR ONE OF THAT REPORT HAS BEEN TAKEN AS FY80. THE TWELVE HELICOPTERS RECOMMENDED IN THE REPORT ARE DUE FOR DELIVERY THROUGHOUT FY 79 AND ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ASSESSMENT.

A) EQUIPMENT: 4 - 65' PB MK3 (SEE SPECTER CLASS); 4 - 100' CPIC (COASTAL PATROL INTERDICTION CRAFT)

INTENTIONS: WITH THIS EQUIPMENT THE BDF NAVAL ARM SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF SAFEGUARDING BAHRAIN AGAINST THE THREAT OF SEABORNE ATTACK AND HOSTILE INFILTRATION, PRTECTING BAHRAIN'S SHIPPING/

OIL RIGS IN OFFSHORE WATERS AND RENDERING ASSISTANCE IN SEA/AIR RESCUE.

B) EQUIPMENT: 24 - M167 TOWED VULCANS WITH RADAR; 24 - MIIP 1 1/4 TON TRUCKS: 36 - AN/VRC-47 RADIOS; VARIOUS SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION.

INTENTIONS: WITH THIS EQUIPMENT THE GROUND FORCES WILL BE ENABLED TO REACT QUICKLY TO SURPRISE LOW LEVEL AIR ATTACKS AND TO PROTECT PRIORITY INSTALLATIONS.

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FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
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INFO SECDEF WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 MANAMA 1655

DEPT PASS AID AND ACDA WASHDC

C) TRAINING IS PROJECTED TO MAXIMIZE EFFECTIVENESS OF MATERIAL IN ALL THREE SECTIONS OF THE BDF, INCLUDING TRAINING FOR THE OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE HELICOPTERS SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY IN FY 79. THE BDF HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO PROJECT ITS TRAINING NEEDS IN AGGREGATE AS FIRM DECISIONS ON ALL MATERIAL TO BE PURCHASED HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN MADE.

(9) BAHRAIN IS THE POOREST OF THE GULF STATES AND, AS SUCH, IT MUST KEEP IN MIND BOTH NEEDS IN OTHER SECTORS AND AVAILABILITY OF OUTSIDE, MAINLY SAUDI, FINANCING WHEN MAKING DECISIONS ON MAJOR PURCHASES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. SENIOR BAHRAINI OFFICIALS ARE FULLY AWARE OF THESE CONSTRAINTS AND NEITHER WANT NOR SEE THE NEED FOR AN EXTRAVAGANT PROGRAM OF DEFENSE SPENDING. THE LEVEL OF THE PRESENT PROGRAM, AND THE MODEST PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW, ARE OF DIMENSIONS WHICH

ARE UNLIKELY TO AFFECT ADVERSELY BAHRAIN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GOALS, NOR ITS FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES. MAJOR EXPENDITURES FOR EQUIPMENT WILL CONTINUE TO BE COVERED BY SAUDI SUBVENTIONS.

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(10) THE MATERIAL WHICH THE USG HAS AGREED TO SELL OR IS LIKELY TO AGREE TO IN THE FUTURE WILL NEITHER INTRODUCE NEW AND SOPHISTICATED CAPABILITIES INTO THE AREA NOR BE IN QUANTITIES SUFFICIENT TO HAVE ANY ARMS CONTROL IMPACT AS DETERMINED BY THE TRANSFER OF ARMS POLICY GUIDELINES OF MAY 1977.

(11) THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR VERY SMALL SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENT IN BAHRAIN IS MINIMAL. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY MODIFICATION IN ITS FORMULATION OR CONDUCT WILL AFFECT U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES.

(12) IN ADDITION TO SAUDI ASSISTANCE IN THE MILITARY FIELD, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN A BROAD RANGE OF FIELDS COMES FROM BOTH KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA. THE SUPPLY OF TECHNICAL EXPERTISE FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (ESPECIALLY U.K.), THE U.S. AND THE U.N. IS EFFECTED ON A PARTIALLY REIMBURSABLE BASIS. THE U.S. PEACE CORPS IS PRESENTLY PHASING OUT ITS SMALL PROGRAM. GOB ESTIMATES THAT IT WILL RECEIVE IN FY 79 SUBVENTIONS IN THE FORM OF DONATIONS AND LOANS VALUED AT \$105,462,450.00 WHICH REPRESENTS APPROXIMATELY 27 PERCENT OF ITS TOTAL PLANNED EXPENDITURE OF \$394,600,000.00.

(13) OUR INTERPRETATION OF PARA 2(C) OF REFTEL D IS THAT IT IS UNNECESSARY FOR MANAMA TO COMPLETE THIS SECTION AS OURS IS AN EXCLUSIVELY FMS CASH PROGRAM.
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Message Attributes

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